Savings decisions under life-time and earnings uncertainty : empirical evidence from West German household data by Rodepeter, Ralf & Winter, Joachim
SONDERFORSCHUNGSBEREICH 504
Rationalita¨tskonzepte,
Entscheidungsverhalten und
o¨konomische Modellierung
Universita¨t Mannheim
L 13,15
68131 Mannheim
No. 98-58
Savings decisions under life-time and earnings
uncertainty:
Rodepeter, Ralf
 
and Winter, Joachim
  
November 1998
Financial Support from Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, SFB 504 at the University of Mannheim,
is gratefully acknowledged.

Sonderforschungsbereich 504, email:

Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universita¨t Mannheim, email: winter@rumms.uni-mannheim.de
Preliminary version; comments are much appreciated.
Savings decisions under life-time and earnings uncertainty:
Empirical evidence from West German household data

Ralf Rodepeter and Joachim Winter

University of Mannheim
First draft: November 1998
Abstract: We analyze a model of life-cycle savings decisions which allows for both life-
time and income uncertainty. We then simulate life-cycle saving rates based on empirical
income processes estimated from West German household data. Our main ndings are,
rst, that allowing for mortality risk improves the life-cycle model's predictions slightly,
and second, that simulated saving rates still fail to match their empirical counterparts.
While our model correctly predicts dierential peak saving rates during working life for
three household types that face dierent income processes, it cannot explain an important
salient feature of saving in Germany: Empirically, there is almost no post-retirement
dissaving, while our life-cycle model predicts substantial dissaving even though we control
for the generous German pension system which results in relatively high post-retirement
income.
Keywords: savings, life-cycle models, income uncertainty, life-time uncertainty
JEL classication: D91

We wish to thank Axel Borsch-Supan, Anette Reil-Held and Reinhold Schnabel for helpful discussions
about EVS income and wealth variables, and Melanie Luhrmann for dedicated research assistance. Axel
Borsch-Supan, Silke Januszewski and seminar participants at the University of Mannheim provided
helpful comments on an earlier version. Financial support from Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft is
gratefully acknowledged.

Address : Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universitat Mannheim, D-68131 Mannheim
E-mail : ralf@econ.uni-mannheim.de, winter@rumms.uni-mannheim.de
1 Introduction
A key element of household behavior, saving, is still not satisfactorily understood. The
seminal life-cycle theory of saving by Ando, Modigliani and Brumberg (e. g., Modigliani
and Brumberg (1954)) has been augmented with features such as liquidity constraints,
mortality, income risk and other uncertainties, and, more recently, by behavioral elements.
While each of these extensions explains some part of saving behavior, empirical contradic-
tions remain widespread, especially when looking at household data (see Browning and
Lusardi (1996) for an overview).
In this paper, we contribute to this literature by adding a new combination of extensions
to the standard life-cycle model. Specically, our model combines liquidity constraints and
both life-time and income uncertainty. Neither of these features is new to the literature, of
course. Liquidity constraints have been considered by, inter alia, Deaton (1991). Life-time
uncertainty has rst been analyzed by Yaari (1965) in a model of life-insurance demand.
Skinner (1985) introduced uncertainty about the time of death in a life-cycle optimization
framework, and Hurd (1989) analyzed the eect of life-time uncertainty on bequests. In
Skinner's model, which is closest to the one we analyze below, life-time uncertainty is
the only source of uncertainty while both the interest rate and the income processes are
assumed to be known with certainty. Models with a xed planning horizon (i. e., certain
time of death) and income uncertainty have been discussed extensively in the literature
(for example, Zeldes (1989a), Carroll (1992, 1997) and Hochguertel (1998)). The way in
which we combine these features is new, to the best of our knowledge. Moreover, we test
whether the fact that households dier in the degree of income risk they face matters for
life-cycle saving decisions. We do this by considering three types of occupation that are
likely to involve dierent degrees of income risk.
The empirical strategy of this paper is standard: We simulate savings decisions over the
entire life cycle using a numerical solution of the underlying intertemporal optimization
problem, taking the income process as given. However, we do not use xed growth
rates in the deterministic income component, but use empirical age-income proles, an
issue to which we return shortly. We then compare our simulated age-savings proles
with empirical age-savings proles for West German households. The dataset we use
is a large pseudo-panel that consists of four waves covering the 1978{1993 period, the
Einkommens- und Verbrauchsstichprobe (EVS), a datset that is roughly comparable to
the U.S. Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX).
One important feature of our simulation analysis is that we calibrate income processes
for three household types that dier both in their life-cycle income proles and in income
risk. In addition to the average household, we also consider households whose heads
are civil servants (who are subject to relatively modest degrees of income risk) and self-
employed (who face higher income risk than the average household). It is well known that
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in models with precautionary or buer-stock saving, a higher variance of labor income
should increase saving.
There is a growing literature that tries to test this implication by analyzing the eects
of past income variance on current wealth. Skinner (1988) uses occupation dummies
in an approach that is closest to ours in sprit: we also compare saving rates across
dierent occupation groups. However, Skinner's ndings are in contrast to those we
report below; he nds that savings of people with riskier incomes are lower. Carroll
and Samwick (1997, 1998) estimate income variances from panel data and then regress
the level of wealth on these variances, nding that wealth is systematically higher for
consumers with higher income variability. A number of studies use panel data from
Italy to assess the eects of income variability. These include Guiso et al. (1992, 1996),
Lusardi (1997) and Pistaferri (1998). A common conclusion from these studies is that
income uncertainty indeed increases savings and/or wealth. An important advantage
of the Italian panel which these authors use is that it contains subjective measures for
expected income variability; this allows to avoid some identication problems associated
with the estimation of income variances and the use of occupation dummies.
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Finally,
Gakidis (1997) estimates a portfolio choice model for 1984 using PSID data, in which
income dynamics enter via parameters estimated over the 1974{1984 period from the same
panel. He also nds that \the stochastic properties of labor income have a substantial
eect on stock-holding behavior".
Because of the limitations of our dataset, we cannot estimate the parameters of a fully
specied income process. Instead, we calibrate the parameters of the income process
such that they reect relative dierences in income risk between the household types we
consider. The deterministic component of the income proles, i. e., the income growth
rates, are then taken to match their empirical counterparts. In our view, this is an
improvement over related simulations studies in which the deterministic component of
income growth is assumed to be constant over the active working life.
2
By taking this approach to simulating life-cycle savings proles, we implicitly assume
that the income process experienced by households is exogenous with respect to savings
and other life-cycle decisions; this assumption is standard in this literature. It implies,
however, that we abstract from labor supply decisions which would be part of a richer
model of a household's life-cycle behavior. In such a model, the income process is en-
dogenous with respect to savings and other life-cycle decisions such as labor supply and
1
For example, Guiso et al . (1996) argue that \occupational dummies may capture labor supply eects
that have little to do with risk" (p. 162). Lusardi (1997) also concludes that occupation dummies
might be a bad proxy for income variance in wealth regressions.
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In an empirical analysis of the determinants of wage growth among young workers in Germany, Dust-
mann and Meghir (1998) stress the fact that understanding the determinants of wage growth is impor-
tant in empirical life-cycle models. With our data, we cannot explore the determinants of individual
wage growth, but at least we allow wage growth to vary over time.
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retirement.
3
We note from the outset that simulating savings proles derived from such
a more realistic model of life-cycle behavior has to be left for future research.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. We report empirical income and
savings proles for West Germany in Section 2. In Section 3, we present a version of
the standard life-cycle model of savings decisions which allows for both life-time and
income uncertainty. We calibrate this model to match German household data, solve
it numerically and compare simulated saving rates with their empirical counterparts in
Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Empirical income and savings proles for West Germany
The empirical life-cycle savings and labor earnings proles which we present in this section
are based on German household data taken from the 1978, 1983, 1988 and 1993 waves of
the Einkommens- und Verbrauchsstichprobe (EVS). The EVS is the German equivalent
of the U.S. Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX). However, the EVS is not a panel,
rather, it consists of repeated cross-sections based on quinquennial surveys conducted by
the Federal Statistical Oce. Currently, the 1993 wave is available as a public use le to
researchers; data from earlier waves can be obtained under certain restrictions.
The two measures we use in this paper are household net income (specically, net labor
and transfer income, i. e., disposable income excluding interest on current wealth), and
total savings, dened as the residual of total household income and total expenditures in
a given period. Details of the construction of our income and savings measures can be
found in the Data Appendix. In what follows, we use pooled data taken from all four
waves, measured in 1991 prices (unless noted otherwise).
As noted before, we consider two types of households which are supposed to dier from
the \average household" in the degree of income risk they face. Hence, our benchmark
is the average of all households, referred to simply as the group of all households in the
sequel. The subset of households whose head is a civil servant is taken to represent
low-risk income households, and the sub-set of households whose head is self employed is
taken to face a high degree of income risk.
Figure 1 shows age-income proles for the three occupation groups. One can see that these
groups start with rather dierent average levels of net income at the age of 20. Also, the
life-cycle proles are remarkably dierent, with the peak of net income at 43 years for all
households, 45 years for the self employed, and at 52 years for the civil servants. After the
age of 60, we only report income and savings proles for the average household because
3
For example, Houser (1998) presents a dynamic, stochastic model of labor supply and savings decisions
that exhibits such features. His primary interest is on labor supply, however. Rust (1990) describes
a model of decisions at the end of the life cycle that also allows for both labor supply and savings
decisions. His main interest is the timing of the retirement decision.
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the income growth rates and saving rates do not dier very much for retired households
while measurement problems become increasingly serious after retirement for a number
of reasons. Together with the fact that the variances of the income processes are likely to
dier accross these groups as well (an issue to which we return below), the dierences of
the age-income proles shown here suggest that it is important to distinguish household
types when analyzing life-cycle savings decisions.
Next, we show empirical savings proles. Figure 2 depicts total household savings in
levels for the three occupuation groups. It does not come as a surprise that savings are
much higher for the self employed than for the average household, given that most of
them are not covered by public pensions and therefore save more for old age. Also, civil
servants save more in absolute terms than the average household; this is due mainly to the
higher average income of civil servants (who benet from a very generous old-age pension
system). In Figure 3, we present a cohort analysis of total savings, again in levels. This
analysis is better suited to assess the pure age prole of savings because age and cohort
eects can be distinguished. Note that the savings prole is roughly hump-shaped as
predicted by standard life-cycle models. However, only two age-cohort observations show
negative saving after retirement, while the majority of households seems not to dissave
after retirement. This is in stark contrast to the predictions of the pure life-cycle model.
The same conclusion holds when we look at saving rates. Figure 4 shows saving rates
for our three occupation groups. The dierence between all households and civil servants
is now smaller, as using saving rates allows to control for dierences in the levels of net
income over the life cycle. Again, we control for cohort eects in a second picture (Figure
5), and the conclusion is the same as before: The age prole of saving rates exhibits the
hump shape predicted by life-cycle models until retirement. After the age of 60, however,
saving rates do not decline as predicted by the standard model, but rise again. Although
measurement problems might be a problem for the oldest old, a violation of the standard
life-cycle model's predictions cannot be disputed.
To summarize these empirical results: First, we have documented just another instance
in which the standard life-cycle model is rejected by the data { in this case using very
detailed household data from Germany.
4
Second, there are considerable dierences in the
levels of the age-proles of both net income and savings between occupation groups that
vary in income risk, a fact that needs to be accounted for when simulating and evaluating
savings proles based on some variant of the life-cycle model.
4
Similar ndings have been obtained earlier, using the 1978 and 1983 waves of the EVS, by Borsch-
Supan and Stahl (1991) and Borsch-Supan (1992).
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3 A model of savings decisions under life-time and earnings
uncertainty
We now present a life-cycle model of savings decisions with both life-time and income
uncertainty. We also model liquidity constraints (in an implicit fashion). Section 3.1
describes the basic set-up of the model. Its solution is characterized by an Euler equation
in Section 3.2, and in Section 3.3, we show how the resulting policy function can be derived
numerically.
3.1 Set-up of the model
Individuals (or households) are assumed to maximize, at each discrete point  in time,
the expected discounted utility of future consumption. The per-period utility function is
denoted by u(C

), to be specied below. Future utility is discounted by a factor (1+)
 1
,
where  is the time preference rate. The interest rate is denoted by r. The maximum age
a person can reach is T , and we dene s

t
as the probability to survive period t conditional
on having survived period  . To simplify notation, we also use a binary random variable
that indicates whether an individual survives period t conditional on having survived
period t  1:
S
t
=
(
0 if the individual survives period t
1 if the individual does not survive period t
The household's intertemporal optimization problem can be stated as follows. In the
planning period  , the maximization problem is given by:
max
fC
t
g
T
t=
E

T
X
t=
(1 + )
 t
S
t
u(C
t
) s.t. (1)
A
t
= (1 + r)(A
t 1
+ Y
t 1
  C
t 1
) (2)
A

 0 (3)
A
T
 0 (4)
C
t
 A
t
+ Y
t
(5)
Maximization of expected discounted utility given by (3.1) is subject to a number of
standard restrictions, an asset recursion (2) and non-negativity conditions for initial and
terminal assets (3) and (4). Note that while we require assets to be zero in the terminal
period T , the individual might die before T with non-zero assets, i. e., there are accidential
bequests in our model. These can even be negative as long as condition (5) holds. We
include (5) as an explicit borrowing constraint which states that current consumption
cannot exceed the sum of current assets and current labor income. However, we do not to
impose this condition explicitly in solving the optimization problem. Instead, we impose
5
the borrowing constraint implicitly.
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As Schechtman (1976) and Zeldes (1989b) have
shown, a borrowing constraint arises endogenously if consumption cannot go to zero in
each period (i. e., if the marginal utility of consumption goes to innity as consumption
goes to zero), and if there is a positive probability of income dropping to zero in each
period. The former is ensured by an appropriate functional form of the utility function
u(C
t
), the latter by the specication of the income process.
The income process, Y
t
, is formulated in terms of a long-term income component, P
t
, as
in many standard life-cycle models with income uncertainty (see, e. g., Carroll (1997)).
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Specically, we dene current income, Y
t
, as
Y
t
= S
t
V
t
P
t
: (6)
Here, the long-term income component, P
t
, is weighted with two random variables. First,
as an extension to the Carroll model, we take into account life-time uncertainty via the
\survival" variable S
t
. Recall that this variable reects life-time uncertainty and takes
the value 1 as long as the individual is alive while it is set to zero thereafter.
Second, labor income is weighted with V
t
, a random variable with unit expectation that
allows for periods with zero income. This zero-income variable is specied as
V
t
=
(
0 w.p. p
1=(1  p) w.p. (1  p)
(7)
where p is an exogenous probability. The zero-income variable is introduced to assure that
borrowing constraints arise endogenously. One can think of these zero-income periods as
periods during which the household head is unemployed. After retirement, zero-income
periods might be thought of as periods in which unforeseen circumstances (such as large
health expenditures) depress disposable income. To keep the model simple, the process
that governs these zero income realizations is assumed to be serially uncorrelated.
7
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Deaton (1991) considers explicit liquidity constraints.
6
Note that this long-term income component is not exactly the same as permanent income in the
traditional sense, although the literature usually refers to P
t
as permanent income.
7
If a period of zero income is associated with unemployment, one might prefer transition probabilities
to be state-dependent. One could generalize the zero-income process used here by specifying an
employment state variable that follows, say, a rst-order Markov chain, although to our knowledge
this has not yet been done in the literature on life-cycle savings decisions.
6
The long-term income component itself is assumed to follow a random walk with drift,
an assumption which is standard in the literature.
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Earnings shocks aect the income
process via the equation
P
t
= G
t
P
t 1
N
t
; (8)
where G
t
is the exogenously xed and deterministic rate of wage growth, and N
t
is a
log-normally distributed random variable with unit expectation and variance  which
captures income uncertainty. Note that when income follows a random walk, a shock to
current long-term income shifts the entire path of future income.
Finally, we assume that the utility function is of the constant relative risk aversion
(CRRA) type,
u(C
t
) =
C
1 
t
1  
; (9)
where   1 is the coecient of relative risk aversion (and the inverse of the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution).
Before we discuss the solution of the model in detail, we want to provide some intuition
about the model's properties. Note rst, that the intertemporal budget constraint with
life-time uncertainty can be written as:
T
X
t=
C
t
(1 + r)
 t
= A

+ E

"
T
X
t=
Y
t
(1 + r)
 t
#
= A

+
T
X
t=
s

t
(1 + r)
 t
E

(Y
t
) (10)
Second, the solution to the model given by (3.1) { (6) can be characterized by the following
rst-order condition:
u
0
(C
t
) =
1 + r
1 + 
S
t+1
E
t
(u
0
(C
t+1
)) : (11)
This is a modied version of the standard Euler equation in which next period's expected
marginal utility is weighted with the conditional probability of surviving period t.
3.2 Backward solution and the Euler equation
To solve the dynamic optimization model for the case with implicit borrowing constraints,
we apply the cash-on-hand approach by Deaton (1991) in the version developed by Carroll
8
Random-walk income processes have been analyzed by Carroll (1992, 1997), inter alia. There are also
models in which income does not follow a random walk. For example, some papers consider autore-
gressive processes with high degrees of persistence (e. g., Skinner (1988) and Bertaut and Haliassos
(1997)). As an extreme case, we have also experimented with income processes in which shocks are
purely transitory, and we found that when we scale the variance of an i.i.d. income process appro-
priately, we can generate life-cycle saving rates which are virtually identical to those obtained in this
paper where we use a random walk specication.
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(1992). Cash on hand, denoted by X
t
, is the household's current gross wealth (total
current resources), given by the sum of current income and current assets,
X
t
= (1 + r)(X
t 1
  C
t 1
) + Y
t
: (12)
As Deaton (1991) has shown, the solution to the intertemporal optimization problem is a
function of cash on hand, so we are looking for a policy function of the form C
t
= C
t
(X
t
).
Trivially, the household consumes all remaining wealth in the last period of life, hence
C
T
= X
T
: (13)
For the remaining periods, the model can be solved by backward induction starting from
the last period, T . Combining (11) and (13), one obtains
u
0
(C
T 1
) =
1 + r
1 + 
S
T
E (u
0
(X
T
)) : (14)
Before deriving the solution for the remeining periods, we normalize consumption and
cash on hand by long-term average income, P
t
,
c
t
=
C
t
P
t
(15)
x
t
=
X
t
P
t
: (16)
Dividing by long-term income, P
t
, yields stationarity of c
t
and x
t
(although the random-
walk component of income, P
t
, is non-stationary). Using these denitions, we can express
cash on hand as a function of last period's consumption and cash on hand, and of current
realizations of the stochastic shocks.
x
t
=
(1 + r)(X
t 1
  C
t 1
)
P
t
+
Y
t
P
t
(17)
=
(1 + r)(x
t 1
  c
t 1
)P
t 1
P
t
+ V
t
S
t
(18)
=
(1 + r)(x
t 1
  c
t 1
)
G
t
N
t
+ V
t
S
t
(19)
Substituting this expression in the Euler equation (14), we obtain for period T   1:
u
0
(c
T 1
P
T 1
) =
1 + r
1 + 
S
T
E (u
0
(x
T
P
T
)) (20)
u
0
(c
T 1
) =
1 + r
1 + 
S
T
E (u
0
(x
T
G
T
N
T
)) (21)
=
1 + r
1 + 
S
T
E

u
0

(1 + r)(x
T 1
  c
T 1
)
G
T
N
T
+ V
T
S
T

G
T
N
T

(22)
The rst order condition contains only current consumption; it can therefore be solved
numerically, yielding a policy function c
T 1
= c
T 1
(x
T 1
). By similar arguments, one
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can obtain rst order conditions that depend only on current consumption for all earlier
periods. In general, these policy functions take the form
c
t
= c
t

(1 + r)(x
t 1
  c
t 1
)
G
t
N
t
) + V
t
S
t

; 8   t  T   1: (23)
Expressions (13) and (23) allow to solve the entire intertemporal optimization problem by
backward induction and to derive a sequence of optimal consumption decisions, fc
t
g
T
t=
.
3.3 Numerical solution procedure
Numerical solutions are obtained by backward induction, iterating on the Euler equation.
We start with the last period, in which C
T
= X
T
trivially and then iterate on the policy
functions (23). The range of possible values for consumption, c, and cash on hand, x,
is approximated by a nite grid with 100 values. The upper end-point of the grid is set
to 20 times the maximum of the long-term income component, the lower end-point is set
to 1 (a consumption level close to zero will never be reached because of the shape of the
CRRA utility function we use). The values of the grid are quadratically spaced so that
the approximation is ner for lower values of c and x.
9
By evaluating optimal decisions for all values on this grid, the policy functions (23)
can be traced out. This is done repeatedly for each period from T   1 through  . To
save on memory, we replace the 100 points of these value functions by tting a low-
dimensional polynomial at each point in time (i. e., we only need to store the coecients
of these polynomials and not all 100 pairs of grid points). In practice, we used third-order
polynomials, and experimenting with polynomials of higher order did not improve the
results. In our experience, this solution method proved to be very fast and reliable.
4 Comparing empirical and simulated savings proles
In order to generate life-cycle saving rates from equation (23), we need to specify the
values of the model's exogenous parameters. The parameter values used to calibrate the
model for our numerical simulations are described in Section 4.1. Simulation results are
presented in Section 4.2.
4.1 Calibration
Table 1 contains the parameters common to all household types; these are the preference
parameters, the interest rate and the number of planning periods. The values we choose
are standard in simulation studies of intertemporal saving decisions (see, e. g., Hochguertel
9
As we analyze a well-behaved intertemporal optimization problem, the true solution will be approxi-
mated to an arbitrary degree as the number of grid points approaches innity.
9
(1998)). Survival probabilities are taken from the 1993 life tables for West Germany (see
Sommer (1994)). Although we simulate household decisions, we use survival probabilities
for males for practical purposes. Survival probabilities for ages 100 and beyond which are
not covered by published life tables were set to zero at age 115 (so T = 115) and then
exponentially extrapolated for ages 100 through 115. Note that the conditional probability
of surviving another year for a 100 year male is still 37%, so these probabilities are not
negligible. The planning age is  = 20.
10
Table 1: Parameter values used for calibration: common to all household types
parameter all household types
relative risk aversion coecient  3
rate of time preference  6%
interest rate r 3%
conditional survival probabilities S
t
life-table values
number of simulation periods
a
T    115  20 = 95
a
In the case of no life-time uncertainty, we x T = 80.
Table 2 lists the parameters of the income processes for all households and for two sub-
groups, civil servants and self-employed. As mentioned before, we stratify our sample
by occupation of the household head to allow dierent degrees of income risk. Civil
servants are taken as a typical low-risk group, while self-employed are taken as a high-
risk group. Standard deviations and zero income probabilities are chosen to reect these
dierences. For example, the standard deviation of the income process faced by a self-
employed household head is taken to be twice as large as that of other household types.
Moreover, the zero income probability of civil servants is assumed to be much smaller (0.2
%) and that of the self-employed much higher (2.0%) than the 1% probability we assign
to the group of all households.
11
The table also contains the value of the starting income
at planning age ( = 20); it is given by the mean of net labor income for each group
computed from the EVS. The deterministic income growth rates, G
t
, are not reported in
detail. They are computed to match the shape of the empirical income proles for each
occupation group which are shown in Figure 1.
10
When we simulate the model with no life-time uncertainty (Figure 7 below), we x the planning horizon
at age 80, the conditional life expectancy at the planning age 20.
11
We cannot provide better estimates of the empirical income proles given the limitations of our dataset.
Thus, the values we assign should be taken to reect the relative dierences of these occupation groups
rather than exact point estimates. Fitzenberger et al . (1997) provide the most detailed analysis of
wage dynamics in (West) Germany available to date; their analysis is based on detailed longitudinal
wage data for the 1976{84 period that were collected by the German labor authorities. The income
processes we use are qualitatively consistent with their ndings.
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Table 2: Parameter values used for calibration: income processes by household type
parameter all households civil servants self-employed
starting net labor income
a
Y

DM 22,350 DM 29,000 DM 38,750
standard deviation  0.2% 0.2% 0.4%
zero income probability p 1.0% 0.2% 2.0%
a
Source: EVS 1978{93; own calculations. In 1991 prices.
4.2 Simulation results
We begin by looking at the consequences of including life-time uncertainty in the standard
life-cycle model with no income uncertainty. Figure 6 depicts the resulting age-savings
prole. The prole exhibits the well-known hump shape: Negative savings in the early
years of the working life, increasing saving rates until the age of about 50 years when
income reaches its peak (see Figure 1), then declining savings with negative savings during
retirement. Finally, saving rates increase again for those happy few who happen to be still
alive at 90. This is due to the fact that seen from the planning age of 20, life expectancy
is about 80 so that most resources will be spent by this age. By construction, the saving
rate is zero at the age of 115, the planning horizon and the age at which all people die in
our model (even though there is life-time uncertainty over the entire life cycle). For the
remaining simulations, we show age-savings proles only until the age of 80.
From Figures 7 and 8, one can see how introducing life-time uncertainty aects saving
in the standard model with income uncertainty. Without life-time uncertainty (and a
planning horizon xed at age 80), predicted savings during working life are much too high
(Figure 7). Introducing life-time uncertainty (with a planning horizon of age 115 and
life-table survival probabilities) improves the life-cycle prole of saving rates considerably
as can be seen from Figure 8.
Next, we consider the eects of allowing for dierent income processes in the model
with both life-time and income uncertainty. Figure 9 depicts simulated and empirical
saving rates for low-risk civil servants, and Figure 10 for the high-risk self employed.
Our simulations show that the self employed (high income risk, higher levels of income)
should save more than the average household, while civil servants who face only modest
degrees of income variability (regarding both income level and variance) should save less.
Comparing simulated and empirical saving rates, one can see that our life-cycle model
correctly predicts dierential peak saving rates during working life for the three household
types.
However, the life-cycle model with life-time and income uncertainty cannot explain an
important salient feature of saving in Germany. Empirically, there is almost no post-
retirement dissaving { and hence no distinct hump shape in saving, both in levels and
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in saving rates. Our life-cycle model, however, predicts substantial dissaving (as do all
standard variants of the life-cycle model). This prediction comes about for all household
types we consider, even though by using empirical income processes, we control for the
generous German pension system which results in relatively high post-retirement income.
Recall that these simulations are based on calibrated income processes that dier in
starting income, in the deterministic income growth rates (and hence income levels) over
the life cycle, and in income variance.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we have analyzed a model of life-cycle savings decisions which incorporates
both life-time and income uncertainty (together with implicit liquidity constraints). We
simulated life-cycle savings proles based on empirical labor earnings processes estimated
from West German household data and compared these simulated proles with their
empirical counterparts.
Our approach extends the existing literature on life-cycle savings decisions in two respects.
First, in our theoretical model and in the simulation analysis, we allow for both life-time
and income uncertainty. Second, we consider households which dier in both the shape of
their income proles over the life cycle and in income risk. In the simulation analysis of our
model, we use time-varying income growth rates estimated from panel data and calibrate
variances to allow for dierential income risk. Taken together, these modications of the
standard life-cycle model allow us to gain further insights into the nature of precautionary
and buer-stock saving and to re-assess the life-cycle model's ability to explain observed
savings behavior.
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Our main ndings are, rst, that the life-cycle shapes of simulated
saving rates for the three income types dier considerably, and second, that allowing for
mortality risk improves the life-cycle model's predictions slightly.
Regarding the empirical results, there are good news and bad news. For the good news,
our simulated saving rates qualitatively match their empirical counterparts in the sense
that they predict dierent peak saving rates during working life { specically, these are
much higher for the self employed in both our simulations and in the data. This is due to
the fact that the self employed face higher income risk and typically do not have access
to the public pension system. For the bad news, none of the models we consider captures
an important salient feature of savings proles derived from German household data:
Empirically, we nd almost no post-retirement dissaving. This is in stark contrast to all
variants of the life-cycle model which predict saving to become negative after retirement.
12
Borsch-Supan et al . (1999b) take a broader view on how the standard life-cycle model can be modied
in order to reconcile its theoretical predictions with the existing empirical evidence. In particular, they
discuss the issue of whether savings proles generated by dierent life-cycle models are empirically
identied.
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Note that this theoretical prediction arises even in our simulations where we use empirical
post-retirement incomes (including pensions). Compared with many other countries these
are higher in Germany due to its generous pension system. In our simulations, this results
in predicted dissaving which is slightly less than in models calibrated to, say, the U.S.
pension system (see, e. g., Hochguertel (1998)).
There are a number of extensions which one might consider in this line of inquiry. For
example, it would be interesting not only to use the means of income and saving for each
occupation group in our analysis, but to use dierent percentiles of the income distribution
in order to check how life-cycle models predict savings away from population means, in
the upper and lower end of the income distribution. Also, we simulate saving rates, i. e.,
we focus on total saving. As noted for example by Guiso et al . (1996) and Hochguertel
(1998), dierences in income risk might aect not only the level of saving, but also portfolio
choice. Hence, one might wish to investigate the composition of households' assets in the
empirical analysis. Finally, we have already noted in the introduction that treating labor
supply and retirement decisions as exogenous is a serious shortcoming in much of the
literature on life-cycle savings decisions. These are issues left to future research.
To gain a better understanding of savings decisions is not only a challenging theoretical
exercise { it is also central to applied policy analysis. For example, the current debate
on reforming social security requires reliable models of household behavior to simulate
the consequences of population aging and suggested policy reforms. Although the version
of the life-cycle model we considered in this paper does not quite succeed in predicting
observed savings behavior, we have shown that the modications we introduced improve
its performance. We therefore believe that allowing for mortality risk and dierential
income uncertainty is a step in the right direction. There are still many interesting issues
that can be persued following this line of research; this is particularly true for many
peculiar features of saving behavior in Germany which are induced by its public pension
system and other institutional arrangements.
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Data Appendix
The microdata we use in this paper are taken from the 1978, 1983, 1988 and 1993 waves of
the Einkommens- und Verbrauchsstichprobe (EVS), a dataset that is roughly comparable
to the U.S. Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX). The EVS is based on a quinquennial
survey conducted by the Federal Statistical Oce. However, the EVS is not a panel
study but rather consists of repeated cross-sections. The EVS is designed to cover about
0.3 percent of the household population, but unfortunately, it is top-coded { it excludes
(approximately) the top 2 percent of the income distribution. In 1993, East Germany was
covered for the rst time.
For the purpose of this simulation study, we need two income measures and a measure of
total household expenditures. The income measure used in the earnings proles that enter
our simulations is net income dened as the sum of net labor income and the net balance
of recurring public and private transfers. Note that this income measure excludes interest
on current assets and non-recurring private transfers because these income components
would distort our simulations of life-cycle savings decisions. Savings are constructed as
the dierence of disposable income (net income as described before, plus non-recurring
transfers such as bequests and inter vivos transfers) and total expenditures. We use only
data on West German households and exclude households headed by foreigners. Unless
noted otherwise, observations from all four EVS waves are pooled (in real terms).
The denitions of the two income measures are summarized in Table 3; the denition of
total expenditures is contained in Table 4. A detailed discussion of measurement prob-
lems encountered in constructing theses measures from the four EVS waves is available
in Borsch-Supan et al . (1999a); that paper concentrates on the eorts made to ensure
consistency of variables across all four waves { a task which proved quite challening task
because of the many changes in the survey design, especially between the earlier waves
and the 1993 EVS.
A number of issues are worth mentioning. In Germany, contributions to the public pay-
as-you-go pension system are mandatory for a large fraction of the population (excluding
most of the self-employed, however). We treat these contributions like taxes; hence, they
reduce disposable income and are not part of household saving. Symmetrically, pensions
are generally treated as part of the household's income, so they do not imply dissaving
during retirement. However, contributions to funded pension plans are treated as saving,
and pension received from such schemes are treated as dissaving. An important fraction
of private saving in Germany consists of whole life insurance (i. e., life insurance policies
that include a saving plan). It is dicult to separate the savings portion of life insurance
policies with EVS data, and we need to use some approximations here (see Walliser and
Winter (1998) for a discussion). Another serious shortcoming of the EVS is poor data
on consumer durables. Because we do not have the reliable historical cost data we would
need to construct stocks and users costs for durables (even for motor vehicles), we treat
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Table 3: Denition of net income
income components
gross income gross labor income
recurring public transfers, including pensions
net balance of recurring private transfers
non-recurring private transfers (if less than DM 2,000)
./. taxes etc. income taxes, including church rates
property taxes
mandatory contributions to social security,
including contributions to the public pension system
voluntary contributions to the public pension system
Note: Disposable income is dened as net income plus interest and dividend income on current assets,
plus the net balance of non-recurring private transfers in excess of DM 2,000 (e. g., bequests and inter
vivos transfers).
Table 4: Denition of total expenditures
expenditure components
private consumption food, clothing, etc.
rents
electricity, gas, etc.
consumer durables
health care
transport and communication
education, entertainment, leisure
other private consumption
misc. taxes taxes on bequests and inter vivos transfers
motor vehicle tax
other taxes
insurance fees voluntary contributions to public and private health insurance
motor vehicle insurance
legal, liability, accident insurances
other private insurances
expenditures for durables entirely as consumption. Finally, while we treat housing wealth
as part of the household's total wealth and related ows as saving and dissaving, there are
a number of dicult issues related to current expenditures for owner-occupied vs. rented
housing. For details, we refer to Borsch-Supan et al . (1999a) and Schnabel (1998).
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Figure 1: Empirical net income profiles
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Figure 2:
 Empirical savings profiles
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Figure 3: Empirical savings profiles: cohort analysis
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Figure 4: Empirical saving rates
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Figure 5: Empirical saving rates: Cohort analysis
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Figure 6: Simulated saving rates: no income uncertainty, life-time uncertainty, all household types
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Figure 7: Simulated saving rates: random walk income, no life-time uncertainty, all household types
-30%
-20%
-10%
0%
10%
20%
30%
20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80
Age
EVS
Model
Source: EVS 1978–1993; own calculations.
Figure 8: Simulated saving rates: random walk income, life-time uncertainty, all household types
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Figure 9: Simulated saving rates: random walk income, life-time uncertainty, civil servants
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Figure 10: Simulated saving rates: random walk income, life-time uncertainty, self-employed
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